Torturing children would be wrong if everyone approved

Contested

Serious philosophers argue this both ways. Say so before your friend does.

What the argument says

Almost everyone lives as if some things are really wrong. Torturing children for fun is not a matter of taste.

It would still be wrong if every culture on earth approved. The argument is that facts like that fit a universe grounded in a personal Good better than one of particles.

The famous objection, and the real answer

Euthyphro asks it this way. Is a thing good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good?

If the first, morals are arbitrary. If the second, the standard sits above God.

The classic answer is a third option the question leaves out. The Good is God's own nature.

Commands express it.

What this argument does not say

It does not say atheists are bad people. It does not say they cannot tell right from wrong.

Romans 2:14-15 says the opposite. Gentiles without the law "do by nature what the law requires." Scripture itself blocks that move.

Their answer, at full strength

Erik Wielenberg keeps moral facts and drops God. Basic truths like "cruelty is wrong" can be necessary brute facts, needing no ground.

That is exactly how you treat God's nature. Graham Oppy adds that "God's nature is the Good" only moves the problem.

Is that nature good for the traits it has, or good just because it is his? And J.

L. Mackie waits on the other side.

Perhaps there are no real values, and our sense of duty is an evolved projection.

How strong is this argument?

Contested. The divine-nature answer does kill the popular form of Euthyphro.

Wielenberg's version is a real rival. The power of this argument is lived, not logical.

Most people cannot actually live as if nothing is wrong.

What to say

"Do you think some things would still be wrong even if every person alive approved of them?"

Eleanor Roosevelt holding a poster of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1949

Eleanor Roosevelt holding a Spanish text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1949

Allan Ramsay's portrait of David Hume, who argued that no 'ought' follows from an 'is'

How they answer this — at its strongest

Moral facts can be brute and necessary, they say, with no God under them.

Erik Wielenberg and Graham Oppy grant moral realism entirely, and keep God out of it. Basic ethical truths — 'pain is bad', 'cruelty is wrong' — can be necessary brute facts that need no ground. That is exactly how the theist treats God's nature: as an ungrounded stopping point.

Saying 'God's nature is the Good' only moves Euthyphro along. Is God's nature good because of the properties it has? Then those properties do the work, and God is not needed. Or is it good merely because it is God's? Then the arbitrariness is back.

Meanwhile J. L. Mackie's other horn waits. Perhaps there are no objective values at all. Our sense of binding duty may be an evolved projection. That is exactly what selection would produce, whether or not it tracked any truth.

The verdict

Contested: this one bites in life more than on paper, so never say atheists lack morals.

Honest grade: contested. The divine-nature answer does dissolve the popular form of Euthyphro. But Wielenberg's godless Platonism is a real rival, and thoughtful skeptics will use it.

The power of this argument is lived rather than logical. Most people cannot actually live as nihilists, and the argument names why. Never, ever let it slide into 'atheists have no morals'. See the don't-use entry. Scripture itself forbids that move.

Open this case in the full study tool →